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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia 
At Wytheville. 
J nne Term, 1931. 
WILLIAM CECIL KENNARD 
vs. 
TRAVELERS PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION 
OF AMERICA. 
PETITION 
To THE HoxoRABLE ,J USTlCES OF ·rHE SuPREME UouBT OF 
.APPEAl$ OF VIRGINIA: 
Your petitioner, William Cecil l{ennard, considers him-
self aggrieved by an order ~D.f the Court of Law and Chancery 
for the city of Roanoke, Virginia, entered on the 8th day of 
October 1930, in an action at law wherein yowr Petitioner was 
the plaintiff and the Travelers Protective Association of 
Americat) a fraternal benefit society incorporated under the 
laws of the State- of Missquri, was the defendant. 
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Your petitioner wishes to here state that he adopts this 
petition as his brief and sets out herein a fair and concise 
statement of all the pertinent facts of this case, those which 
are controverted as well as those which are conceded, with the 
legal questions involved, and the authorities upon which he re-
lies £or the contentions here made. 
A copy of this petition has on this day, October 24, 19a3, 
been presented in person to Attorneys Woods, Chitwood, Coxe 
and Rogers of Roanoke, Virginia, the opposing counsel in the 
trial court. 
A copy of the record is herewith filed from which the 
following "ill appear: 
STATEMENT OF FACT. 
11he not.ice of motion for judgment filed in the Clerk's Of-
fice on August 12, 1930, returnable to the September 1930 
term of the Court of La,v and Chancery for the city of Roan-
oke, Virginia, asks for judgment in the sum of $823.21 with in-
terest from July 12, 1930, f·o·r this, to-wit: 
31 weeks of total disability., from August 29, 1929 
to April 3., 1930, at the rate of .$25.00 per week $775.50 
3 6 ;7 weeks of partial disability from April 3, 
1930 to April29, 1930 at the rate of $12.50 per week $48.21 
by virtue of a contract of insurance between '\Villiam Cecil 
l{ennard and the Travelers Protective Association of Ameri-
ca, dated April 3, 1916. 
The plaintiff, while a. member in good stand~ng in the 
defendant associatkn, suffered an accident on the night of 
August 6, 1929 to his right foot, which accident produced1 an 
injury and which injury developing on August 29, 1929, wholly 
tlisabled tl1e plaintiff until Apr:I 3, 1930, wah partial dis-
ability thereafter until April 29, 1930. As soon as Kennard 
acquired knowledg·e of having suffered an injury, which was 
on August 29, 1929, he immediately called a physician and 
notice as required by the certif:cate of insurance wa.s given by 
the said Kennard to the Association on September 6., 1929. 
A final statement of his claim, :duly certified, 'vas given to. the 
Association on April 29, 1933, a.nd the Association's final re-
fusal to pay was given on July 12, 1930. 
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By order entered September 22, 1930, the notice of motion 
was amended so that the Constitution and By-laws of the A.s· 
sociation might be a part of the reco.rd, whereupon the Assoc· 
iation filed its demurrer, relying upon two sections of . its 
Constitution and By-laws, which are the only two sections 
pertinent to the defense o.f this case, and only those two sec-
tions were, ·by agTeement of counsel, placed in the record. 
The facts in this case are not disputed, and especially upon 
the argument of the dlemurrer it is conceded, as pleaded, that 
Kennard suffered an accident on August 6, 1929, that the in-
jury developed to the point that he had lmowledge of an in-
jury on August 29 ,1929, that immediately a physician was 
called, and that the required report 'vas made to the Associa-
tion on September 6, 1929, and further that the said Kennard 
has complied with all the conditioill.S of the policy and' has 
violated none .of its prohibitions, and that his damage, if com-
pensable, is in the sum of $823.21, with interest from July 12, 
1930. 
The demurrer interposed hvo defenses: 
First: That there was no allegation stating Kennard 
became ''immediately'' disabled, in aoooTdance with the by-
law whieh reads, in part, as follows: 
''Whenever a Class A member of this Associat,ion \. 
in g,cod stand:ng shall through external violent and ae-
c1dlental means receive bodily injuries 'vhich shall in-
dependently of all other causes immediately, contin-
uously and wholly disable.:--et.c.'' 
Second: That there was no allegation stating 'vritten 
notice of the alleged aceident was given within thirty days 
thereafter, in accordance with the by-law which reads, in 
part, as follows: 
''Any member in g·ood standing meeting with an 
accident, as described in this Constitution, ·must call a 
regular phys:c:an or surgeon and notify the National 
Secretary in writing within thirty .a:ays of the event 
causing the injury--etc.'' 
Upon the argument of the demurrer the defendant As 
sociation insisted that the Constitution and By-laws. as writ-
•. 
ten were a part of the policy inasmu:ch as the same are refer4 
red to on the face of the policy, contending that the admitted 
accident to Kennard did not ''immediately'' disable him; and, 
further, that the notice, go1od in all other respects, having been 
given on SeptemJber 6, 1929, was not ''within 30 ·dlays of the 
event causing the injury'' - the accident having occurred on 
August 6., 1929. 
'l,he plaintiff Kennard insisted upon an interpretation of 
the terms of the policy - there being a sharp conflict between 
the provisions as set out in the policy with the provisions of 
the by-law-to determine whether immediate disability wa8 
requisite to recovery. On the face. of the policy is a suppos-
ed exerpt from the by-law which omits the word "immediate-
ly", reading, in part, as follows: 
· ''- whenever a member in good standing shall, in-
dependently of all other causes, through ·external, vio-
lent and accidental means, receive bod[ly injuries which 
shall solely and exclusively cause death or disability.'' 
The plaintiff Kennard further insisted that the notice to 
be given "within 30 days of the event causing the injury'" is 
to be interpreted as meaning that the notice shall be given 
'vLthin 30 days of the fme that the assured, in good faith, had 
kno~wledge of an injury covered by the p~licy. 
T·he demurrer was sustained, and the plaintiff refusing 
to amend his notice of motion the case was dismissed. 
ARGUMENT. 
There are only hvo questions involved in this case, whicb 
quest:~ons are really ones of interpretation. 
First: Did the Court err in deciding that an injury to be 
compensable under this policy must occur insta~tly upon the 
happening of an accident when a conflict in the''provisions is 
pla!nly evident-the iby-law using the word "immediat~ly" 
and the face of the policy apparently setting out an excerpt 
flicm that l1y-la'v purposely omits the 'vord "immediately"! 
Second : Did the Court err in deciding that the claimant·. 
cannot recover hecauJse he failed to give notice within 30 dayH 
of the event causing the injury when the undisputed facts 
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sho'v that the claimant gave the required,notice within 8 days 
of the time he 'ln1ew he had suffered au injury, and which 
notice was within 8 days of the development of the injury: 
Ne-ither of these points seem t.o have arisen, ~or to have 
been dec1dled in Virginia. But there is the Virginia rule, ap-
plicable alike to both points·; to the effect that the phraseology 
of an insurance contract 'vhen such contract has heeu drafted 
by the insurer, in case of ambiguity, especially "rhere a for-
feiture is involved, shall be most strong-ly construed against 
the insurer and in favor of the insured. See 84 Virginia 116; 
91 Virginia 305 ; 93 Virginia 138. 
The Court will readily be convinced that 'accident' and 
'injury' are different things. According to Wharton the mean-
ing to be attached to the word accidlent is any unforseen 
event pr.c.ducti:ve of disadvantage ; while according to' ·Webster 
the injury is the damage or h11ri. done or suffered. 
'fhe Court shall construe the true contract between the 
parties, and when the pro vis: ons as stated in the by -law are 
compared with the provisions on the face of the policy appli-
C3lble to the question 'vhether or not ''immediate injrlry'' is a 
term of the contract, a conflict is immediately noticeable. The 
by-law says: 
''Whenever a Class A member of this Association 
in good standing shall through external violent and ac-
c:,d!ental means receive bodily injuries which shall in·· 
dependently of all other causes immediat~!Y~co~tinl;lOUS­
ly and wholly disabl~tc. ':__. ~ (-, ,-f·;< ~ :-2 :j . · 
.L--r~t . -'\ : ~ ~ .... ~-
While a prov~1si '~ <:(~~tfi~ ·-ra!: ~f . th~·. po£c~ -~s ensibly 
/ "ta.tJ~eJil [r9m this sa e:_ .. , '-1~ sa.ys: 
// ·:.Jfj)\f/ . 
·- r.,:\''·\ "Whenever a member in go s ding shall, in-~.-P· ~/fj ' dependently of aU other causes, hrough external, 
,\\'! violent and accidental mean.~, re . ·ve bodily inju11es 
• which shall solely and exc.Iusi vely c use death or dif.;. 
' ability." l · 
'fhe Court shall also determine whether 1. is an 'injury' 
or an 'ace! dent' against which the plaintiff was insured·. 
Assuming· for the sake of argument at this pnint that the 
word immediate is a part of the contract. There are two line~ 
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of thought in the adjudicated cases of our si~ter states where-
:in !::iUch a provision has been construed, one line of cases hold-
ing that it is a 'vord of causation, the other line hloliling. it is a 
word o.f time. There is still another thought to be added, to-
wit: it is a word of degree. It is a fact, especially since this 
case stands· on a ·demurrer tha.t there were no intervemng , . 
~auses ibetween the happening of the accident and the· de.velop-
ment of the injury. The accident caused the injury which 
d~.maged, and the by-laws a,bove quoted clearly show it is an 
injury against which the plaintiff 'vas insured. The germ of 
the injury was placed instantly upon the happening of the ac-
cident, for there were no intervening causes~ and 'vhile the in .. 
jury at the time of the accident 'vas small, not recognizable, 
yet the germ of the injury grew and in 23 days it reached! suc.b 
proportions as to be noticed. In Rok.es versus Amazon, 5i 
:Wiaryla.nd, 512, though l1olding that immediate· is a. 'vord or 
causation says that immediate w;ould hardly mean the same 
thing as "instantly" or "momentarily". Thus the word im-
mediate takes on the quality of degree. 1\fust the injury fol-
. lowing the acc:dent develop in one m:nute, one hour, one day 
or one month? True, some line must be drawn. Certainly if 
there is no intervening cause contributing to the injury, tlle11 
the accid.ent and the injury are e1cse1y linked and if the claim. 
ant is acting in g·ood faith the equities are with him, and im-
mediate might as well mean one month a.s one minute. On the 
other band, the time, or deg-ree, should be narrowed if the 
c1aimant is endeavoring to present a false cla.im or is not aer..-
ing· in good faith. 
'ro hold, as some States do, that immediate is a word of 
causation and that no interval of t2me must elapse between 
the acC'ident and injury is too harsh and Is absolutely contrary 
to the ·virginia .d!octrine of construction, especiaHy when it in-
vol<es a forfeiture. Since this point has no.t been decided in 
Virginia. this Court is open to place such a. construction on the 
extent of degree the· word immediate means a.Jld further as to 
whether it is a. word of causati011 or time, a.s it thinks ·will ac-
compl1sh the purposes of the contract between the pnrties . 
. Just LeC'a.nse the injury was sl,ow in developing to a. po1nt 
that it could be recogni7.ed is no justification for say;ng that 
the aooident. didn't cause the injury and tha.t the injury 'vas not 
immedia.te. The Barnes case from J{ansas, found in 80 Pacific 
1020 takes this view. In that case the claimant swa1lowed a 
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pin on July 23rd and! became wholly disabled on A.ugust 4th. 
'rhat poHc.y provided only for an in.iury which should im-
mediately disalble. There the Court held the word immediate 
should llJOt mean ''at once", but that it must be held to allow 
for the period that nature takes t.o develop the injury, and that 
this period varies in all people. 
From 14 Ruling Case Law, Section 491, on page I;-~17, we 
find the folio wing lang-uage: 
''immediate injury following an ·accidtent means that 
it follows directly from a hurt within such time as the 
processes of nature consume in bringing the insured to 
. a state of incapac~ty." 
So much for the question of degTee---we now come to an-
other phase of this provision in whieh the· decided ·weight of 
aulthorit.y from our sister states is 'v~th this petitioner aud 
relieves him .c.f any burden of sl1owing· that the injury was 
immediate. The Court must construe the contract between 
the parties; and the Court is reminded that the construction 
shall be most strongly aga1nst the insurer and in favor of the 
insured, under the Virginia doctrine, especially where a for-
feiture is involved! so that indemnity 'vill be granted rather 
than denied. The burden is upon the Association to invoke 
the forfeiture as well as to show where' n the contract pro-
vides that the accident must immediately disable before the 
plaintiff is entitled to recover. 
~ehe policy, on its face, says in effect: "receive bodily in-
juries which shall solely and exclusively cause disability'". 
The word "immediate" is not used in the face of the polic.y. 
Conflicting therewith, the rules of the Association say: "the 
injury shall immediately disable.'' Which shall govern' 
The decided we:ght of authority, wherever this question 
has arisen, and there are no· \rirginia authoritie?s disputing 
the point, says the policy itself must go'"vern the rig·hts of the 
pa.rt:es. The initial lead in support of this view is found in 
14 Ruling Case Law, page 935, which deals with conflicts be-
tween the expression~ in the policy. and in the ib~T-la,vs, and 
says that the provisions as set out in the policy must govern. · 
The foregoing statement remains authority even when 
the by-laws be referred to and are made a part of the policy 
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by reference. The insurance company having undertaken to 
make a recital of rights on the face of the policy and thereby 
produces a conflict will be held to have waived the by-law. 
In the case <>f McCoy, from Wisconsin, found in 47 LRA 
page 681, the by-law of the Association excluded liability iu 
case of suicide, but the policy made no such restriction. It 
'vas there held that the issuance of the policy was a mere vio-
lation of the by-law which would not necessarily affect the 
contract. The Court in that case further said : '' Wl1ere the 
certificate o,f a multual benefit society is inconsistent with the 
by-laws of the Association, the certificate is nevertheless 
binding.'' 
The :I'YicOoy case refers to the case of Fitzgerald ~oun.d 
in 18 NYSR page 9'14, wherein it was held that in the absence 
o.f fraud, a prorvision in a certificate of memlbership in n 
mutual life association 'vill prevail over a clause in the by-
laws of such Association conflicting therewith and tending to 
lin;tit its liability, even though the application states such by-
law to be a part of the contract. 
There is an exhaustive note fo1lowing the nfcCoy case 
in 47 LR.A page 681 support:ng the holding, 'vherein the 
statement is made that in case of conflict between the by -lavls 
and the certificate or policy., the latter prevails. 
The case of Davidson, from Minnesota, fow1d in 1 LRA 
. page 482, shows this to have long been the rule, for it says: 
''Where a policy of insurance is issuJedJ by a mutual 
benefit society the terms of which are in conflict with 
a hy-la\v of the society, the society must be deemed to 
have waived the provisions of the by-law in favor of 
the assured; a.nd ,vherein they are inconsistent 'vitl1 
the provisions of the policy the latter will control the 
rights of the parties." Could anything be ciearerY 
We now come to: the question of Timely Notice. Sincn 
it is the injury for which the Association is to ccmpensa.te the 
assured, the Association is only interested in being advised or 
injuries. They have no reason to be advised of accidents which 
remain accidents and never produce injuries. The policy can 
only mean tha.t it will compensate for injuries which gr.ow out 
of accidents, andl a claim could not be sulbmitted nor reported 
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to the Association of which they would take cognizance until 
the claimant lmew, to the point he could state, he had some in. 
jury. Thus, the Association is ta: be notified of injuries only, 
and notice given "within the time limit after the assured in 
good faith knew he had suffered an injury is sufficient.'' 
That is what the law requires and this is the interpretation 
tha.t has been placed upon similar contracts by the great ma· 
jority of the courts. 
In the case of Rorick from California, found in 119 Fed-
eral 63, the policy provided for notice te: be g·iven in "rrhing 
within 1.5 days of the accid;ent causing the disability and fail-
ure to give the notice was to render the policy void. The 'i'-<>li-
cy also declared all terms to be conditions precedent. The ae-
cident caused what "'as supposed at the time to he only a 
trivial discomfort to the read andl the company was not noti-
fied within 15 days of the accident. For this reason the court 
sustained a dlemurrer, and the case was appealed. The Appel-
late Court reversed this ruling saying that the accident cover-
ed by the policy was not complete until disability or dea.th re-
sulted, and tha.t notic-e giver~ within 15 days of tht dis81bility 
or death was sufficient. · 
In the case of Hanson from ColoradO:, found in 79 Pacific 
176, the policy provided for 'vritten notice within 10 days of 
the event causing accident. The accident occurred on June i, 
1897 and the notice was not given until February 1898. The 
giving of notice was part of the main issue. The notice was 
given within 1!') days after t.he r laimant 'kne'v the accident 'vas 
the cause of the injury. The Court held that this would not 
work a forfeiture as such provisions should he liberally con-
strued in favor of the beneficiary, and recovery was allowed. 
To the same general eff.ect is the case of Peele from In-
diana, found in 46 NE pag·e 990. 
In the case of Trippe, from New York, found in 35 NE 
page 316, the policy requtired notice 'vithin 10 days of either 
injury or death, otherwise the policy to be void. The notice 
was given within 10 days of the discovery of the body, which 
was the time the beneficiary obtained lrno,vledge of right to 
make claim, which time was not within 10-days of either the in-
jury or death. The Court held that the reasonable interpre~ 
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tation was not 10 days from the date of the accident, but from 
the time the facts were ascertained. 
In the case .of Phillips from Michigan found in 79 NW 1, 
tp.e same rule of interpretation was followed. 
This rule of interpretations as to timely notice is also 
supported by the writers in 14 Ruling Case Law, page 1134. 
~NU~iERA'fiON OF AlJTHORITIES UPON WHICH 
PETl'riONE~R RELIES. 
As to the question of Immediate In;jury, and the question 
of Conflict between the Provisions of the By-La.ws and Policy, 
the f~onowing: 
14J{uling Case Law;, page 935; 
66 Northwest page 697; 
47 LR.A page 681, and note; 
39 Northwest page 803 ; 
1 LRA. page 482. 
As to the question of Timely Notice, the following: 
119 Fedleral page 63 ; 
. 79 Pacific page 176; 
35 Northeast page 316 ; 
46 Northeast page 990; 
79 Northeast page 1 ; 
101 Southwest page 152; 
14 Ruling Case Law, page 1134. 
CONCLUSION. 
We submit that the trial court was in error in sustaining 
the demurrer as to either of the two defenses raised therein. 
It is a conceded fact there were no intervening causes between 
the accident and the injury, and tc· require that the accident 
shall instantly produce an i~jury before there can be a re-
co\~ery invokes an un\varrantable forfeiture and defeats the 
plain purpose of the contract. 
We fUirlher submit that the trial court was in error in 
reading into the contract the word ''immediate''. An instan-
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taneous· injury arising from the accident is not essential tore-
covery upon the statements on the face of the pohcy, and the 
provision can only be brought into the policy accordiing to t~e 
trial court's view by the reference in the policy to th•~ Con-
stitution and By-laws. This referenc-e, of itself, produces a 
conflict in the provisions, and the great weight of authority, 
and ::;ound reasoning, dictates that the expressions on the 
face of the policy shall govern. 
We further submit that the notice of injury was givt>n 
within the time required as it was given within eight days 
after the plaintiff, in good faith, new he ·bad suffered an in-
jury and the plaintiff has acted in good faith, he can only be 
aware of his right to a c1a!m when he has obtained lmcwledge 
of an injury, for an accident not producing an injury would 
never be compensruble. 
We further submit that William Cecill(ennard, plaintiff 
in the case at bar is entitled by this Court to have thE' order 
sustaining the demurrer vacated and to have this case rein-
stated on the trial docket of the lower c.ourt. 
Respectfully submitted, 
\VILLIAlvl CECIL KENNARD, 
By B. E. ESTES, 
Coun8eL 
B. E. F.JSTES, Attorney. 
State of Virginia,· 
City of Roanoke, to-wit: 
I, B. E. Estes, an attorney practicing in the Supreme 
·Court of A.ppeals of Virginia, do certify that in my opinion 
it is proper that the judgment of the Ocurt of Law and Chanc-
ery for the city of Roanoke, Virginiaa: in the case of \Villiam 
Cecil l(ennard versus Travelers Protective Association of 
America, to 'vhlch the record is hereto atta.ched, should be re-
viewed by the Supreme Court of Appeals.-
Glven under my hand, this 24th day of October. 1930. 




We ·have received a copy of the foregoing petition this 
24th day of October, 1930. 
WOODS, CHITWOOD, COXE & ROGERS, 
Attys. for Travelers' Protective Association of America. 
Filed before me Oct. 24, 1930. 
H. B. GREGORY. 
[Writ of Error awarded by Court Order Nov. 11, 1930. 
Bond $3r30.00- Clerk.] 




Pleas !before the .llonorable Beverley Berkeley, .Judge of 
the Court of .Law and Chancery of the City .of Roanoke, on the 
Eighth Day of October, One Thou'sand Nine Hundred and 
'rhirty, (A. D. 1930). 
vYilli am Cecil Ken nard, 
versus 
'rhe Travellers Proteetive 
Association of America.. 
Be it remembered that heretofore; to ... wit: On the 11th 
day of August, 19~0, the plaintiff, " 7illiam Cecil l(enuard 
sued out. of the C'lerk's Office of the C'ourt of Law and Chanc-
ery of the said City ;cf Roanoke, his Notice of l\Iotion for 
Judgment against the defenclan~, 'The Travellers Protective 
Association of America., returnable to the First day of Sep-
tember, 1930, which was duly executed on said defendant, by 
serving on the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Virginia 
the Statutory Agent, and retu.rnerl to said Clerk's Office as re-
quired hy law, "rhich notice of motion is in the words aud fig-
ures f.c.Uowing, to-wit: 
[2] NOTICE OF lviOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
To : The Travelers Protective Association of America, a 
fraternal Benefit Society incorporated under t11e laws 
of t l1e Sta.te of 1\Ussouri: 
You are herehy notified tl1a.t o,n September 1st, 1930, be-
ing the first day of tl1e September 1930 term of the Court of 
Law and Cl1anc.ery for the city of R1oanoke, Yirginh·~ or as 
soon t:C.ereafter as I may be heard, the undersigned will move 
the said C'ourt of Law & Chancery for the city of Roanoke, 
Virginia, fc;r a. judgment and award of execution against you 
for the sum of E!ght Hund.red Twenty--three and 21/100 
., 14 
( $823.21) Dollars, with interest thereon f:r.om July 12, 1930, 
until pai~ together with tbe costs incident to this proceeding, 
which sum is determined in the following manner: 
31 weeks of total disability, from August 29, 1929 
to April3, 1930, at the rate of $25'.()() per 'veek $775.00 
. 3 6/7 weeks of partial disability from April 3, 
1930 to April29, 1930, at the rate of $12.50 per "reek 48.21 
mal{iug·. a total of $823.21 
all of which is justly due and o'ving from you to the under-
signed under and by virtue of a certain contract of insurance 
in writing· made by you with the undersigned on April 3, 1916, 
the undersigned! then residing in Roanoke, Viryinia., which 
certifica.te or c.ontract hereto attached is your. policy N·o. 
·13087 4, and by this reference is asked to be and is made a part 
hereof as much so as if set out herein in haec verba, wherein 
you undertodk and promised to pay to the undersigned the 
sum of .$25.00 per week for total disability from accident ,not 
exceeding 104 weeke., and to furthet· pay $12.50 per week for 
partial disability following total disability from acci-
[ 3] dent, not exceeding five 'veeks, subject to the conditions, 
exceptions and limitations of the Constitution of the 
As~ociation and amendments thereto wheneYer I, being in 
go:cd standing, iiulependently of all other causes through ex-
ternal, violent and accidental means! receive bodily h1juries 
which should solely and exclusively cause disability; and in 
said policy eontained by recital and reference aro sund:ry other 
provisos, conditions, prohibitions and stipulations as by the 
original policy 'vhich is filed herewith will more fully and 
lurgely appear; and, 
After the making of saiid contract ·Or policy as aforesaid, 
the undersigned, "rbile a member of your Assoc~ation in gooct 
standing·, suffered an accident and injury in Roanoke, Virgin-
ia, through exten1al, violent and' accidental means to his right 
foot by striking· the same upon the rocker of a chair while re-
tiring for the night of August 6,, 1929, which eaused an injury 
to said foot, which injury independently of all other causes, 
solely and exclUisively dis-abled the undersigned within the in· 
tent and meaning of the ·provisions of our said contract, the 
said injury developing on August 29, 1929, in my said foot by 
swelling and pain, as a result whereof the undersigned was 
totally d~sabled from Aug"Ust 29, 1929 to April 3, 1930, and 
was partially disabled from -April 3, 1930 to April 29, 1930, 
being· for a part of said time, to-wit: from Aug11st 29, 1929 
to September 6, 1929 in a semi-conscious condition. The under-
sjgned would further show that on AUlgllst 29, 1929., a physic-
ian was immediately called, and on September 6, 1929, notice 
of my said injury was given to your Association in compliance 
with the conditions and regulations of said contract, the cer-
tificate of membership, constitution, by-laws, etc. · 
The undlersigned would show that he ha.s complied with 
and performed all ·of the conditions of said policy and has 
violated none of its prohibitions; and, 
Further, that final statement, duly certified was funl-
[ 4] ished to you on April 29., 1930, and your final refusal 
to pay my said claim was made on July 12, 1930. 
Although due proof of loss has be~n made to you as afore-
said by the undersigned who has complied ~th and perform .. 
ed all of the conditions of sai.d contract or policy, and has 
violated none of its prohibitions, you have not paid to the 
-undersigned the sum of $823.21,, but the same and every part 
thereof are ·wholly unpaid and unsatisfied. to the undersigned, 
contrary t1o the force. and effect of said policy; and althoug·h 
often requested you, have 'vholly neglected, failed and refus-
ed, and still do neglect, fail and refuse to keep your said agree-
ment and perform your said contract; 
\Vherefore .judgment for the sum of $823.21, with inter-
est as aforesaid~ together with said coots will be asked at the 
hands of said Court at the time and place hereinabove set 
out. 
Given under my hand this 11th day ·of August, 193:>. 
WILLIAM CECIL l{ENN ARD, 
By Counsel. 
B. E. ESTES, p. q. 
[For Policy See l\•lanuscript Pages 5 and 6. ·1 
(ENDOR.SE~tJENrr ON BACl{) 
Received August 12, 1930 and filed. 
I. M. WADE, 
Deputy Clerk~ 
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{7] AGREEMENT BY COUNSEL. 
Of the Constitution and By-Laws .of the Travelers Protec-
tice Association of America, now a part of the record, it is 
agreed that it is only necessary for the Clerk of the 
Court of Law and Chancery for the city of Roanoke, Vir-
ginia, to copy Section 6 of Article X found on page 33 of the 
said Constitution and Ry-law~, aJlJd Rection 6 of Article XIII 
found on page 45 of said Constitution and By-laws a.nd of the 
last mentioned secti.cn the copy shall begin with line 24 a.n.d 
continue through line 37. 
[8] 
WIIJLIA:ftl CECIL l{ENNAitD, 
By B. E. l~STJiJS, 
A.ttorney. 
TRAVELERS PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION 
OF AlVlERICA, 
By WOODS, CHITWOOD, COXE ·& R.OGERS, 
Attorneys . 
EXTRACT FRO~I 
CONSTITUTION and BY-LAWS. 
• 
D·i.sability Benefits-Class-A ]! e'Jnbe'rs. 
Sec. 6. Whenever a Class A member of this Association 
in good standing· shall throug·h external violent and accidentai 
means r,eceive bodily injuries which shall independently of' 
all other causes immediately~ continucusly and 'vholly disable 
hun from transacting any a.nd every kind of business pertain-
ing to his occupation as shown by the records of this Associa-
tion, he shall be paid for the loss of thne occasioned: thereby 
the sum of $25.00 per week, not exc.eeding one hundred and 
four consecutive weeks, and $12.50 per week for partial dis-
nb:lity, not to e?Cceed five consecutive 'veeErs . 
.. v,~t·i.ce and Proofs of Accidwnt. 
See. 6. Any member in good standing meeting- with any 
accident, as described in this Constitution, must call a reg-ular 
physician or surgeon and notify the National Secretary in 
'vriting· within thirty days of the event causing· the injury 
giving full particulars of same aud1 name of attending physic-
ian or surgeon. In case of death the beneficiary shall gi.ve 
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such notice within thirty days of the event causing the injury 
or death. In case of failure to notify, except because of un-
consciousness or physical inability the membe~, or his benefic-
iary in case of death, shall forfeit all rights to insurance bene-
. fits. 
[9] P~EA TO GENERAL ISSUE. 
The defendant comes, by its attorneys, and says that it is 
not indebted to the plaintiff in the manner and fo.rm a.s alleg. 
ed in the plaintiff's motion for judgment. A.nd of this, the de-
fendant puts itself upon the country. 
[10] 
WOODS, CHIT·WOOD, COXE & ROGERS, p. d. 
(ENDORSE~IENT ON BACK) 
Filed Sept. 2, 1930 by leave of Court. 
DEMURRER. 
R. J. WATSON, 
Clerk. 
The defendant comes by its attorneys and says tha.t the 
plaintiff's motion nor ,judgment is insufficient in law. in the 
following respects: 
(1) It does not allege that the plaintiff ·became "immed-
iately" disabled as a result of the alleged accident; as requir-
ed byt article 10, ·section 6 of the constitution filed as a part of 
the motion for· judgment, but on the contrary shows that al-
though the alleg·ed aecident occurred ~on August 6th, the plain-
tiff did not become disabled until Au~st 29th. 
(2) The motion for judgment does not allege that writ-
ten notice of the alleged accident of August 6th was g·iven to 
the defendant within thirty days thereafter, as required by 
article 13, section 6 of the constitution filed as an exhibit with 
the motion, but on the contrary shows that such notice was not 
given until September 6th, thirty-one da.ys after the alleged 
injury. 
(3) The motion for judgment does not allege sufficient 
facts to come within the section of the constitution last men• 
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tioned excusing failure to give the required notice within 
thirty days after the alleged accident. 
WOODS, CHITWOOD., COXE & ROGERS, p. d. 
(ENDORSEMENT ON BACI{) 
Filed by leave of Court Sept. 22, 1930. 
L~NA MILLS,. 
· Deputy Clerk. 
[11] ORDERS. 
And at another day, to-wit: 
On the 2nd day of September 1930, the f olluwing order 
was entered. 
On motion of the defendant, by its attorneys, it is permit-
ted to file its plea to the general issue, which .is accordingly 
done. 
And at another day;, to-wit: 
On the 22nd day of September, 1930, the' following order 
was entered. 
By consent 10f parties, by their res-pective attorneys, the 
plaintiff is hereby permitted! to amend his motion for judg--
ment in the foil owing· respects, which amendments are hereiby 
made: 
( 1) In the ·sixth line from the bottom of the first 
page insert after the word "contract" ; "and the consti-
tution and by la:ws referred to therein." 
( 2) In the fifth line from the bottom of the first 
page strike ;out the. 'vord "is" in both places and substi-
tute therefor the 'vord "are" 
And thereupon the plaintiff filed with the papers in the 
case a copy of the constitution and by-laws above referred to. 
----~ - ------ -----~ 
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Thereupon the defendant filed its demurrer to the plain-
tiff's motion for jucllgment, as amended, which demurrer the 
court doth take under consideration. 
We consent to the entry of the foregoing order. 
B. E. ESTES, p. q. 
WOODS, CHI'l'WOOD_, COXE & ROGERS, p. d. 
And at another day, to-wit: 
On the 8th day of October, 1930, the following order 
[11] w·as entered. 
This day came again the parties to this action by their 
attorneys and the court having heard the argume.nt of counsel 
on the demurrer heretofore interposed by the defendi3.nt, hav-
ing maturely considered the same and heing advised of its 
judgment, is of opinion that the demurrer sho'nld be sustain-
ed. It is therefore ORDERED that the said demurrer be sus-
tained and the plaintiff, though granted le~ve so to· td~o, hav-
ing failed to amend his notice of motion for judgment, it is ac-
cording·ly ORDERED that the plaintiff do have and recover 
nothing from the def cudant in this actkn and that the same be 
hence dismissed at the costs of the plaintiff. 
To which action of the court in sustaining defendant's de-
murrer andl in dismissing· this action the plaintiff, by his coun-
sel then and there excepted. 
[121 OLERI('S CERTIFICATE. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Roanoke: 
I, R. J. Watson, Clerk of the Court of Law and Chancery 
of the City of Roanoke, Virginia,,. do her<fuy certify that the 
foreg·oing is a true and correct transcript of the record in the 
case of ·William Cecil Kenna.rd, against The Travellers Pro-
tective Association of .. America, lately determined by said 
Court. I further certify that notice of the application for this 
transcript has been duly given to counsel for the defendant, 
as required by law. 
Given under my ha.nd this 15th day of October, 1930. 
Fee for transcript: $ 
A Copy, 
Teste: 
R. J. WATSON, 
Clerk. 
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